{ "author": { "name": "Maria Titova", "url": "https://maria-titova.com", "email": "motitova@gmail.com", "institution": "Vanderbilt University" }, "source": "https://maria-titova.com/publications.json", "formats": { "markdown": "https://maria-titova.com/publications.md", "bibtex": "https://maria-titova.com/publications.bib" }, "papers": [ { "id": "TA-elections", "title": "Targeted Advertising in Elections", "authors": [ "Maria Titova" ], "status": "published", "section": "Published Work", "year": 2026, "month": 1, "journal": "American Economic Journal: Microeconomics", "volume": "Forthcoming", "doi": "10.1257/mic.20240479", "pdf": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/TA_in_Elections.pdf", "fullText": { "html": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/TA-elections", "markdown": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/TA-elections.md" }, "slides": "https://maria-titova.com/slides/slides-TA.pdf", "links": [ { "label": "Full text", "url": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/TA-elections" }, { "label": "Full text (Markdown)", "url": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/TA-elections.md" }, { "label": "PDF", "url": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/TA_in_Elections.pdf" }, { "label": "Slides", "url": "https://maria-titova.com/slides/slides-TA.pdf" }, { "label": "DOI", "url": "https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20240479" } ], "abstract": "How does targeted advertising influence electoral outcomes? This paper presents a one-dimensional spatial model of voting in which a privately informed challenger persuades voters to support him over the status quo. I show that targeted advertising enables the challenger to persuade voters with opposing preferences and swing elections decided by such voters; under simple majority, the challenger can defeat the status quo even when it is located at the median voter's bliss point. Ex-ante commitment power is unnecessary—the challenger succeeds by strategically revealing different pieces of verifiable information to different voters. Publicizing all political ads would mitigate the negative effects of targeted advertising and help voters collectively make the right choice.", "bibtex": "@article{TA-elections,\n author = {Maria Titova},\n title = {Targeted Advertising in Elections},\n journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},\n volume = {Forthcoming},\n year = {2026},\n month = {jan},\n doi = {10.1257/mic.20240479},\n url = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20240479},\n}" }, { "id": "PVI", "title": "Persuasion with Verifiable Information", "authors": [ "Maria Titova", "Kun Zhang" ], "status": "published", "section": "Published Work", "year": 2025, "journal": "Journal of Economic Theory", "volume": 230, "pages": "106102", "doi": "10.1016/j.jet.2025.106102", "pdf": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/PVI.pdf", "fullText": { "html": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/PVI", "markdown": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/PVI.md" }, "slides": "https://maria-titova.com/slides/slides-PVI.pdf", "links": [ { "label": "Full text", "url": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/PVI" }, { "label": "Full text (Markdown)", "url": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/PVI.md" }, { "label": "PDF", "url": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/PVI.pdf" }, { "label": "Slides", "url": "https://maria-titova.com/slides/slides-PVI.pdf" }, { "label": "DOI", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2025.106102" } ], "abstract": "This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the game and compare them with commitment outcomes in information design. We provide conditions for a commitment outcome to be an equilibrium outcome and identify environments in which the sender does not benefit from commitment power. Our findings offer insights into the interchangeability of verifiability and commitment in applied settings.", "bibtex": "@article{PVI,\n author = {Maria Titova and Kun Zhang},\n title = {Persuasion with Verifiable Information},\n journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},\n volume = {230},\n pages = {106102},\n year = {2025},\n doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2025.106102},\n url = {https://maria-titova.com/papers/PVI.pdf},\n}" }, { "id": "shopping-malls", "title": "Shopping Malls, Platforms and Consumer Search", "authors": [ "Alexei Parakhonyak", "Maria Titova" ], "status": "published", "section": "Published Work", "year": 2018, "journal": "International Journal of Industrial Organization", "volume": 58, "pages": "183--213", "doi": "10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.02.004", "pdf": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/malls_paper.pdf", "fullText": { "html": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/shopping-malls", "markdown": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/shopping-malls.md" }, "slides": "https://maria-titova.com/slides/malls_slides_UCSD.pdf", "links": [ { "label": "Full text", "url": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/shopping-malls" }, { "label": "Full text (Markdown)", "url": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/shopping-malls.md" }, { "label": "PDF", "url": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/malls_paper.pdf" }, { "label": "Slides", "url": "https://maria-titova.com/slides/malls_slides_UCSD.pdf" }, { "label": "DOI", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.02.004" } ], "abstract": "We consider a model of a market for differentiated goods in which firms are located in marketplaces e.g., shopping malls or platforms. There are search frictions between marketplaces, but not within. Marketplaces differ in size. We show that an equilibrium in which consumers start their search at the largest marketplace and continue in the descending order of size, always exists. Despite charging lower prices, firms in larger marketplaces earn higher profits. Under free entry, all firms cluster in one marketplace provided that search frictions are large enough. If a marketplace determines the price of entry, then the equilibrium marketplace size is a single-peaked function of search costs and is decreasing for most of the search cost range.", "bibtex": "@article{shopping-malls,\n author = {Alexei Parakhonyak and Maria Titova},\n title = {Shopping Malls, Platforms and Consumer Search},\n journal = {International Journal of Industrial Organization},\n volume = {58},\n pages = {183--213},\n year = {2018},\n doi = {10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.02.004},\n url = {https://maria-titova.com/papers/malls_paper.pdf},\n}" }, { "id": "reveal-conceal", "title": "Revealed and Concealed Repression: Theory and Measurement", "authors": [ "Maria Titova", "Nathan Canen", "Emily Hencken Ritter", "Mehdi Shadmehr" ], "status": "in journal", "section": "Working Papers", "year": 2026, "month": 4, "note": "Revision requested by the American Political Science Review", "pdf": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/reveal-conceal-repression.pdf", "fullText": { "html": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/reveal-conceal", "markdown": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/reveal-conceal.md" }, "links": [ { "label": "Full text", "url": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/reveal-conceal" }, { "label": "Full text (Markdown)", "url": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/reveal-conceal.md" }, { "label": "PDF", "url": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/reveal-conceal-repression.pdf" }, { "label": "arXiv", "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.16997" } ], "abstract": "Regimes routinely conceal acts of repression. We show that observed repression may be negatively correlated with total repression, consisting of both revealed and concealed acts. This distortion can generate perverse effects for policy interventions designed to reduce repression and complicates inference about the causes and consequences of repression. We develop a model in which regimes choose whether to conceal repression and activists decide whether to challenge the regime. We identify two measurement problems—one due to concealment and one to deterrence. We construct indices of repression that account for these problems and show how these indices can be expressed in terms of observable variables by leveraging equilibrium relationships. We then propose an empirical strategy to estimate these indices. As a proof of concept, we apply this approach to Russia, estimating repression indices at a monthly frequency for 2020–2025.", "bibtex": "@unpublished{reveal-conceal,\n author = {Maria Titova and Nathan Canen and Emily Hencken Ritter and Mehdi Shadmehr},\n title = {Revealed and Concealed Repression: Theory and Measurement},\n year = {2026},\n month = {apr},\n url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.16997},\n note = {Revision requested by the American Political Science Review},\n}" }, { "id": "WVI", "title": "Withholding Verifiable Information", "authors": [ "Denis Shishkin", "Maria Titova", "Kun Zhang" ], "status": "in journal", "section": "Working Papers", "year": 2026, "month": 5, "note": "Revision requested by Theoretical Economics", "pdf": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/wvi.pdf", "fullText": { "html": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/WVI", "markdown": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/WVI.md" }, "links": [ { "label": "Full text", "url": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/WVI" }, { "label": "Full text (Markdown)", "url": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/WVI.md" }, { "label": "PDF", "url": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/wvi.pdf" }, { "label": "arXiv", "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.09918" } ], "abstract": "We study a class of finite-action disclosure games in which the sender's preferences are state-independent and the receiver's optimal action depends only on the expected state. While receiver-preferred equilibria in these games involve full revelation, other equilibria are less well understood. We show that any equilibrium payoff can be obtained with a disclosure strategy corresponding to a partition with a laminar structure that allows pooling of nonadjacent states. In a sender-preferred equilibrium, such a structure balances inducing more sender-favorable actions with deterring deviations. Leveraging this insight, we identify conditions under which the sender does not benefit from commitment power. We then apply these results to study selling with quality disclosure and influencing voters.", "bibtex": "@unpublished{WVI,\n author = {Denis Shishkin and Maria Titova and Kun Zhang},\n title = {Withholding Verifiable Information},\n year = {2026},\n month = {may},\n url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.09918},\n note = {Revision requested by Theoretical Economics},\n}" }, { "id": "CPD", "title": "Coalition-Proof Disclosure", "authors": [ "Germán Gieczewski", "Maria Titova" ], "status": "working paper", "section": "Working Papers", "year": 2026, "month": 10, "pdf": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/CPD.pdf", "fullText": { "html": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/CPD", "markdown": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/CPD.md" }, "slides": "https://maria-titova.com/slides/CPD_slides.pdf", "links": [ { "label": "Full text", "url": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/CPD" }, { "label": "Full text (Markdown)", "url": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/CPD.md" }, { "label": "PDF", "url": "https://maria-titova.com/papers/CPD.pdf" }, { "label": "Slides", "url": "https://maria-titova.com/slides/CPD_slides.pdf" }, { "label": "Lean formalization", "url": "https://github.com/maria-titova/lean-CPD" }, { "label": "arXiv", "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.15087" } ], "abstract": "We study generalized verifiable disclosure by a sender with type-independent preferences. We first characterize all perfect Bayesian equilibria as partitions of the sender's types into coalitions ordered by payoff. An equilibrium survives our coalition-proofness criterion if no group of types can profitably coordinate an announced deviation that only they are able and willing to join. Coalition-proof equilibria are greedy partitions: at each step, a coalition of the remaining types attains the highest payoff consistent with equilibrium. In our general setting, coalition-proof equilibria may fail to exist. We establish existence under restrictions on preferences and evidence: quasiconcavity with message completeness, betweenness, cheap talk with message completeness, and payoff degradation. For a disclosure game with maximally rich evidence, we show that the sender's ex-ante payoff in a coalition-proof equilibrium is a piecewise linear tent over the belief simplex, analogous to the concave closure in Bayesian persuasion and the quasiconcave closure in cheap talk.", "bibtex": "@unpublished{CPD,\n author = {Germán Gieczewski and Maria Titova},\n title = {Coalition-Proof Disclosure},\n year = {2026},\n month = {oct},\n url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.15087},\n}" }, { "id": "manufactured-grievances", "title": "Manufactured Grievances and Regime Survival", "authors": [ "Germán Gieczewski", "Maria Titova" ], "status": "work in progress", "section": "Work in Progress", "slides": "https://maria-titova.com/slides/MG_slides.pdf", "links": [ { "label": "Slides", "url": "https://maria-titova.com/slides/MG_slides.pdf" } ], "abstract": "We develop a model of authoritarian survival in which a regime strategically imposes economic hardship on select citizens to prevent coordinated resistance. Citizens who observe low welfare outcomes are uncertain whether their suffering is localized or widespread, which undermines their ability to assess whether collective action is feasible. We characterize the regime's optimal manipulation strategy and show that survival is guaranteed if and only if the prior probability of a favorable state exceeds a threshold that depends on the regime's strength and the number of citizens. The optimal strategy targets a subset of citizens and randomizes low outcomes among them, introducing endogenous inequality even when citizens are ex ante identical. This mechanism is distinct from information manipulation: the regime never falsifies signals or garbles information, but instead manufactures the underlying grievances themselves. Our results offer a new interpretation of historical episodes such as the Soviet Holodomor and China's Great Leap Forward, and more broadly characterize economic suffering as a strategic instrument of divide-and-rule, complementary to propaganda, censorship, and repression.", "bibtex": "@unpublished{manufactured-grievances,\n author = {Germán Gieczewski and Maria Titova},\n title = {Manufactured Grievances and Regime Survival},\n}" }, { "id": "trade-policy", "title": "Political Messaging and Voter Learning", "authors": [ "Renee Bowen", "J. Lawrence Broz", "Santiago Cantillo-Cleves", "Yung-Chun Chen", "Maria Titova" ], "status": "work in progress", "section": "Work in Progress", "links": [] } ] }