Maria "Masha" Titova

How does targeted advertising influence electoral outcomes? This paper presents a one-dimensional spatial model of voting in which a privately informed challenger persuades voters to support him over the status quo. I show that targeted advertising enables the challenger to persuade voters with opposing preferences and swing elections decided by such voters; under simple majority, the challenger can defeat the status quo even when it is located at the median voter's bliss point. Ex-ante commitment power is unnecessary—the challenger succeeds by strategically revealing different pieces of verifiable information to different voters. Publicizing all political ads would mitigate the negative effects of targeted advertising and help voters collectively make the right choice.

This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the game and compare them with commitment outcomes in information design. We provide conditions for a commitment outcome to be an equilibrium outcome and identify environments in which the sender does not benefit from commitment power. Our findings offer insights into the interchangeability of verifiability and commitment in applied settings.

We consider a model of a market for differentiated goods in which firms are located in marketplaces e.g., shopping malls or platforms. There are search frictions between marketplaces, but not within. Marketplaces differ in size. We show that an equilibrium in which consumers start their search at the largest marketplace and continue in the descending order of size, always exists. Despite charging lower prices, firms in larger marketplaces earn higher profits. Under free entry, all firms cluster in one marketplace provided that search frictions are large enough. If a marketplace determines the price of entry, then the equilibrium marketplace size is a single-peaked function of search costs and is decreasing for most of the search cost range.

Regimes routinely conceal acts of repression. We show that observed repression may be negatively correlated with total repression, consisting of both revealed and concealed acts. This distortion can generate perverse effects for policy interventions designed to reduce repression and complicates inference about the causes and consequences of repression. We develop a model in which regimes choose whether to conceal repression and activists decide whether to challenge the regime. We identify two measurement problems—one due to concealment and one to deterrence. We construct indices of repression that account for these problems and show how these indices can be expressed in terms of observable variables by leveraging equilibrium relationships. We then propose an empirical strategy to estimate these indices. As a proof of concept, we apply this approach to Russia, estimating repression indices at a monthly frequency for 2020–2025.

We study a class of finite-action disclosure games in which the sender's preferences are state-independent and the receiver's optimal action depends only on the expected state. While receiver-preferred equilibria in these games involve full revelation, other equilibria are less well understood. We show that any equilibrium payoff can be obtained with a disclosure strategy corresponding to a partition with a laminar structure that allows pooling of nonadjacent states. In a sender-preferred equilibrium, such a structure balances inducing more sender-favorable actions with deterring deviations. Leveraging this insight, we identify conditions under which the sender does not benefit from commitment power. We then apply these results to study selling with quality disclosure and influencing voters.

We study verifiable disclosure by an informed sender whose preferences do not depend on his type. An equilibrium survives our coalition-proofness criterion if no group of types can profitably coordinate on an announcement that the receiver would interpret as coming precisely from the types willing to join it. We first characterize all perfect Bayesian equilibria as individually rational partitions of the sender's types into coalitions ordered by payoff. Coalition-proof equilibria are exactly the greedy partitions: at each step, a coalition of the remaining types attains the highest payoff consistent with equilibrium. This characterization allows deviations that mix across messages or reuse evidence observed on the equilibrium path. Coalition-proof equilibria need not exist. We establish existence under alternative restrictions on preferences and evidence, including betweenness, quasiconcavity with message completeness, and payoff degradation; existence always holds with two types. Finally, we solve a benchmark in which evidence can identify arbitrary fractions of types. Its selected value is a piecewise-linear tent over the belief simplex, providing a no-commitment disclosure counterpart to the values of Bayesian persuasion and cheap talk.

This paper studies a model of costly sequential search among risky alternatives performed by a group of agents. The learning process stops, and the best uncovered option is implemented when the agents unanimously agree to stop or when all the projects have been researched. Both the implemented project and all the information gathered during the search process are public goods. I show that the equilibrium path implements the same project based on the same information gathered in the same order as the social planner. At the same time, due to free riding, search in teams leads to a delay at each stage of the learning process, which grows with search costs. Consequently, the team manager prefers to delegate the search to an individual agent. In contrast, every agent prefers searching with a partner, since she collects the same reward but only pays the search cost half the time.

We develop a model of authoritarian survival in which a regime strategically imposes economic hardship on select citizens to prevent coordinated resistance. Citizens who observe low welfare outcomes are uncertain whether their suffering is localized or widespread, which undermines their ability to assess whether collective action is feasible. We characterize the regime's optimal manipulation strategy and show that survival is guaranteed if and only if the prior probability of a favorable state exceeds a threshold that depends on the regime's strength and the number of citizens. The optimal strategy targets a subset of citizens and randomizes low outcomes among them, introducing endogenous inequality even when citizens are ex ante identical. This mechanism is distinct from information manipulation: the regime never falsifies signals or garbles information, but instead manufactures the underlying grievances themselves. Our results offer a new interpretation of historical episodes such as the Soviet Holodomor and China's Great Leap Forward, and more broadly characterize economic suffering as a strategic instrument of divide-and-rule, complementary to propaganda, censorship, and repression.